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oth the U.S. public and U.S. policymakers pursue
a love-hate relationship with U.S. schools. While
a majority of parents believe that their children’s
schools are doing well, a majority also believe that
the system as a whole needs help. Complicating this view is a
variety of concerns about specific aspects of U.S. schools—they
are too expensive, too rigid, too elitist, and too unequal.
During the past year, President Clinton has directed
considerable government attention to U.S. education. This
attention follows the lead of Presidents Bush and Reagan, who
also focused on education policy, although the oversight of
such policy is not the primary role of the federal government.
President Bush, for example, in 1989 convened a historic
gathering of the governors of all of the states to focus exclu-
sively on issues of education. The governors set a series of lofty
goals for the year 2000, including the goal that U.S. students
should be first in the world in mathematics and science
achievement. Unfortunately, we are now close to the year
2000, but we are not close to meeting the set goals.
This paper analyzes the current state of the education
system in the United States. In the course of the paper, I
will try to point out where controversy exists, particularly
in academic discussions.
OVERVIEW
I begin with some overall observations and conclusions.
The subsequent discussion will provide some of the relevant
evidence and references to support my conclusions.
As a starting point, educational investments are very
important to the U.S. economy, a fact that suggests there is
much value in an aggressive human capital investment
strategy. The U.S. economy has been built up largely by using
a skilled labor force and has capitalized on the presence of
skills, making human capital investments very important to
the success of the overall economy. Moreover, many authors
show that the labor market value of the increased skills, as
measured by schooling level, has increased dramatically in
B
Eric A. Hanushek is a professor of economics and public policy and
director of the W. Allen Wallis Institute of Political Economy at the
University of Rochester.12 FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / MARCH 1998
recent years. I think this valuation demonstrates that the econ-
omy continues to need an increasingly skilled labor force.
Recent work has also suggested that education is very impor-
tant in boosting the growth rates of the nation as a whole and
that a very important relationship exists between human capital
and growth rates. Economists have recently spent considerable
time and effort trying to understand why some countries grow
faster than others. The majority opinion is that a nation’s stock
of human capital is an important component of differential
growth rates. In addition, we have thought of education as a
primary ingredient in providing equal opportunity to all
members of society as a way of cutting down or breaking
intergenerational correlations of income. Taken together, these
benefits provide important and relatively uncontroversial
reasons for us to continue our attention to education.
The controversies relate in small measure to how
well we have been doing in providing education, but they
relate more to what we should do in the future. My way of
framing the issues follows.
First, U.S. students do not perform well compared
with students from other countries. In international math and
science exams, U.S. students have never performed very well
relative to students of other countries. To compensate for this
relatively low quality, the United States has historically had
high levels of school attainment (years of schooling)—that is,
the United States has substituted quantity for quality. Now,
however, many countries that have had higher student
achievement are beginning to rival the United States on
quantity grounds. This suggests that the U.S. economy
faces new and different levels of competition in the years ahead.
Second, the United States has made steady and large
investments in human capital. The resources invested, how-
ever, have had little payoff in terms of student performance.
Thus, if the United States is to be more competitive
internationally in terms of student achievement, some sub-
stantially different policies will be required in the future.
Third, the most likely changes required in schools
involve radically different incentives for students and for
school personnel. Few direct incentives exist today for
improved student achievement, and marginal changes in
resources or programs are unlikely to have a noticeable effect
on overall student achievement.
Fourth, improved education policies will require
better measurement of student performance. In addition, such
policies will probably require a period of more extensive
experimentation with alternative approaches and incentive
schemes.
These conclusions are roughly ordered in terms of the
amount of evidence and analysis that we have on them and in
terms of the amount of consensus or controversy that exists.
Regardless of one’s views on the underlying controversies,
these conclusions indicate to me that the education sector
deserves considerable attention. At the same time, the form of
this attention is important. Some people have argued that the
high rates of return commonly observed for individual
schooling  clearly justify governmental action. But the case for
governmental involvement in education, as opposed to purely
private decision making on schooling, requires more than
that. Governmental intervention is frequently justified on the
basis of external benefits, benefits that go beyond an individual’s
investment in schooling. Are there external benefits to investing
in education? Education is often thought to be a “large
externality” undertaking, but identification and measure-
ment of those externalities have proved difficult.1 My
candidate for the most important potential external benefit
from investing in education in the United States—which is
new in most thinking—is the overall effect on growth rates and
the potential to affect the economy. The work supporting this
contention is not as refined as you might like: it does not give
precise answers, and there are several qualifications. Nonethe-
less, I think that growth effects are likely to prove to be a very
important policy issue.2 At the same time, while establishing
a role for government research, this issue does not spell out
what such a role should be.
U.S. STUDENT PERFORMANCE
It is useful to begin with the performance of students in the U.S.
educational system. In doing so, it is natural to contrast
performance in elementary and secondary education with that
in higher education. I begin with elementary and secondary
education. In terms of quality of learning, U.S. schools are not
now, and have never been, very competitive when judged by the
performance of elementary and secondary schools around the
world. Chart 1, drawn from Hanushek and Kim (1996), pre-FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / MARCH 1998 13
International Test Score Performance, by Test Year
Chart 1
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sents what we know about all international testing of math and
science scores for U.S. students.
International examinations in mathematics and
science have been given periodically since the 1960s. The
examinations have been taken on a voluntary basis by a
variable set of countries. While there was some concern
about selective test taking in some countries in the early
years, that concern has lessened considerably in the later
years of testing. Further, Hanushek and Kim show that
these tests have considerable validity in describing the
quality of a country’s labor force. For the analysis here, all
the test scores for students in a given country in a given
year are combined to produce a single country test score.
The scores are placed on a scale where the world mean for
each testing year is fifty.
In Chart 1, the year of testing appears along the
top of the chart. Normalized scores are given on the vertical
axis, making it possible to compare countries over time.
The U.S. performance moves around over time.
This drift closely mirrors the average performance of U.S.
seventeen-year-olds on the mathematics and science tests of
the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP)
(see discussion below). Moreover, the key aspect of this figure
is that the United States almost always falls below the
median of whatever group of countries is taking the test.
The results released in the fall of 1996 for the
Third International Math and Science Test placed U.S.
eighth graders in the middle of world performance for
1994-95.3 This performance, which is not included in the
figure, comes even though a very wide range of forty-one
countries participated in the testing. Thus, there is no real
change in the latest scores.
The basic story is that the United States has not
been doing particularly well in international comparisons.
This result is a bit surprising, given that the United States
has an economy built on a skilled labor force. You might
ask, “How could that be?” While the United States is not
doing well, it is producing skilled goods that one might
argue require a skilled labor force.
The answer seems to be that over a long period of time,
quantity of schooling has substituted for quality. Historically,
the United States has had a labor force with more years of
schooling, on average, than the labor forces of other countries,
even if these years of schooling have been of lower quality.
That quantitative superiority is ending. Table 1
compares the percentage of students in different countries
that have received upper secondary school education, essentially
a high school education. These completion rates are broken
down by age.
The important part of breaking these figures down
by age is that they can be read as the schooling policies of
countries in different years. Individuals who are twenty-
five to thirty-four years old in 1992 were educated some-
time in the 1980s. People aged thirty-five to forty-four
were educated in the 1970s. The next group in the table
was educated in the 1960s. And the final group went to
school in the 1950s.
If we look at the 1980s, it is clear that a large
number of countries are rivaling the United States, where
87 percent of students complete their high school education.
Three other countries in the Group of Seven have completion
rates exceeding 80 percent. Of the countries outside the
Table 1
PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION ATTAINING UPPER 
SECONDARY EDUCATION OR MORE
By Country, 1992
Age Group
Country 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64
GROUP OF SEVEN
Canada 81 78 66 49
France 67 57 47 29
Germany 89 87 81 69
Italy 42 35 21 12
United Kingdom 81 71 62 51
United States 87 88 83 73
OTHER
Australia 57 56 51 42
Austria 79 71 65 50
Belgium 60 52 38 24
Czechoslovakia 87 79 68 51
Denmark 67 61 58 45
Finland 82 69 52 31
Ireland 56 44 35 25
Netherlands 68 61 52 42
New Zealand 60 58 55 49
Norway 88 83 75 61
Portugal 21 17 10 7
Spain 41 24 14 8
Sweden 83 76 65 48
Switzerland 87 84 78 70
Turkey 21 14 9 5
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Group of Seven listed in the table, another five have
completion rates above 80 percent. These numbers
contrast sharply with those in earlier decades, when the
United States had a very dramatic lead in terms of quantity
of schooling. Clearly, other OECD countries and developing
countries have dramatically increased the amount of
schooling their youth receive. The United States’ advantage
in quantity of schooling is quickly disappearing.
Charts 2 and 3 provide pictures of science and
mathematics achievement in the United States as measured
by the NAEP, which is currently the best yardstick of stu-
dent performance. The heavy line reflects the average scores
of seventeen-year-olds on the NAEP over time. What we see
from Chart 2 is that today our students are not doing quite
as well in science as they did in 1970 (even though, as
described below, we have been increasing real per pupil
spending steadily over this period). Chart 3 shows essentially
the same thing for math, except that instead of declining,
1996 performance is at about the same level as in 1970. This
picture does not lead anyone to believe that our investment
policy is soon going to address the quality concerns and to
push us to the top of the international rankings. “First in the
world in math and science in the year 2000” was the goal set
forth by the 1989 National Governors’ Conference. It does
not look like we are on that path.
Charts 2 and 3 also suggest that there is a substantial
gap between whites on the one hand, and blacks and
Hispanics on the other. The gap has narrowed some, but it
remains substantial and may have even widened in the most
recent period. This disparity goes back to the equality of
opportunity concerns; it is also consistent with several analyses
that identify the importance of student achievement in
explaining some of the college attendance gaps across different
segments of society. Those attendance gaps exist throughout
this period and seem related to quality of schooling.
The situation with higher education is very different.
U.S. higher education is arguably the best in the world.
Admittedly, data on higher education are not nearly as
good as the data on elementary and secondary education.
It is particularly hard to document quality because we do not
have good, objective measures. Here is what we do know:
• U.S. business and industry are now willing to pay
much more for college graduates than they were in
the past, both in relative and in absolute terms;
• foreign students like to come to U.S. higher education
institutions, while they do not seem to want to come
to U.S. elementary and secondary schools; and
• employers seem much more pleased, at least in their
public testimonials, with higher education than they
are with elementary and secondary education.16 FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / MARCH 1998
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Source:  Hanushek and Rivkin (1997).
This adds up to a prima facie case that quality does not
appear to be a major problem in higher education. By contrast,
the data displayed before suggest that quality is the major
concern in elementary and secondary education. The contrasting
picture makes the recent concentration in 1997 on
higher education by the President and the Congress puzzling—
at least if the policy initiatives are viewed in terms of
education as opposed to pure distributional politics. Perhaps
the one rationalization is that the call for expanding access to
schools— “making the fourteenth year the norm”—is just an
extension of the historic policy of substituting quantity for
quality. Without pursuing the issues of higher education, I
simply assert that elementary and secondary school issues are
the most important and pressing. Thus, the remainder of
this discussion concentrates exclusively on these issues.
A BRIEF HISTORY OF SPENDING GROWTH
The United States has had a consistent focus on education
over a long period of time. This fact surprises many people
in the United States. Statements about “how important it
is that President Clinton has recently focused attention on
education” are common. Implicit or explicit in such discussions
is the sentiment that we have been shortchanging the
educational system. It may be that the President can get
the attention of the population better than anybody else,
but a steady policy thrust and heavy weight have been
given to education and human capital investment for a
long time. This focus on education, however, has not been
at the federal government level.4 Taking the long view,
between 1890 and 1990, we note that real public expenditure
on primary and secondary education in the United States
rose from $2 billion to more than $187 billion.5 Significantly,
this almost hundredfold increase is more than triple the
growth rate of GNP during the same period: current
educational expenditure increased from less than 1 percent of
GNP in 1890 to 3.4 percent of GNP in 1990.6
While increasing enrollment accounts for a portion
of the rise in spending, the rise in per student expenditure
explains the bulk of the change in educational outlays
(Chart 4). Real per student expenditure roughly quintupled
in each fifty-year period between 1890 and 1980: it went
from $164 in 1890 to $772 in 1940, and to $4,622 in
1990. If we divide per student expenditure into salaries for
instructional staff (teachers and principals) and all other
expenditure, we find that the unmistakable pattern here is
the relative growth of expenditure outside of instructional
staff salaries: such spending went from 25 percent of
total current expenditure in 1890 to 33 percent in 1940,
and to 54 percent in 1990.
Two factors stand out as being of primary
importance in explaining total instructional salary
spending over the entire 100-year period: the rising
price of instructional staff and the declining pupil-staff
ratio. Rising teacher salaries were clearly a consequence
of economywide labor productivity growth, although
the extent to which teacher salaries changed relative to
those of other workers is an important issue. By contrast,
the decisions leading to reductions in the pupil-staff
ratio despite the rise in teacher costs suggest a long-
term policy of attempting to raise school quality by
reducing the pupil-teacher ratio.7 There is substantial
debate over the extent to which external changes, notably
the expansion of special education, contributed to the
decline in the pupil-teacher ratio during the 1970s and
1980s. The analysis by Hanushek and Rivkin (1997)
indicates that special education has been important but is
still not the largest influence. The growth in special
education over the 1980s may have accounted for one-FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / MARCH 1998 17
fifth of the growth in spending. (Yet, because of the
smaller overall spending growth in the 1990s, this
percentage has almost certainly gone up.)
PRICE AND QUALITY OF TEACHERS
The desire to reduce classroom sizes has increased the
demand for teachers. At the same time, rising labor
market wages for both college-educated men and, par-
ticularly, college-educated women have reduced teacher
supply. These supply and demand movements offer a
straightforward explanation for the teacher price
increase from $34 per day in 1890 to more than $177
per day in 1990, an increase that accounts for more than
40 percent of the increase in total expenditure on
instructional staff over the century. But these numbers
tell only part of the story. Schools have also been able to
adjust the average quality of teaching personnel by
shifting teacher salaries to accommodate shifts in supply
and demand. Since potential teachers clearly differ in
their skills and consequently their alternative wage
opportunities, any increase or decrease in teacher wages
beyond that occurring in other sectors reflects a change
in where teachers are drawn from the distribution of
workers. This fact would be expected to influence
teacher quality in the long run.8
To trace teacher quality changes, I use annual
earnings data for teachers from the six decennial censuses of
population taken between 1940 and 1990.9 Teacher earnings
are compared with the earnings of those who do not teach.
Specifically, our primary measure of potential teacher quality
is the location of average teacher earnings in the distribution
of nonteacher earnings.10 The lower the percentage of non-
teachers who earn less than the average teacher, the worse the
teaching jobs when compared with alternative occupations.
The use of percentile rankings as opposed to a comparison of
mean earnings reduces problems associated with the census’
top-coding of incomes and lessens the impact of changes in
the tails of the nonteacher earnings distribution.
The movements in relative earnings of teachers
have been dramatic. As shown in Table 2, however, they
differ noticeably for men and women. While the average
male teacher earned more than 84 percent of all males in 1940,
this figure fell to 64 percent by 1990. All of this relative fall,
however, occurred before 1960; following a slight dip in
the 1970s, male teachers have been moving up the earnings
distribution. The overall decline in the relative position of
women teachers has been almost as large, although female
teachers are still better positioned in the earnings distribution
than male teachers. The time path of the decline for
females has been very different, however, with the largest
declines occurring after 1970, when the average
teacher moved a full 10 percentage points down the
earnings distribution.
The implication of this finding is that schools,
while spending increasing amounts on teachers, have also
tended to let the quality of teachers slip. This story
appears to be closely related to arguments such as those of
Baumol (1967). He suggests that a sector subject to low
rates of productivity improvement, frequently for technological
reasons, will find its wage bill and costs rising relative
to those of more advanced sectors. While there are reasons
to be skeptical about the magnitude of any such effects
(Hanushek 1997), the increasing labor costs and potentially
declining teacher quality are consistent with this argument.
RECENT CHANGES IN SCHOOL RESOURCES
The search for more experienced and better educated teachers
has been one of the enduring policy thrusts of the last half
century. This thrust, along with the desire to reduce class
sizes, has been a dominant component of aggregate changes
in schools.
Table 3 tracks these changes from 1960 to 1991.
Teacher education has increased dramatically, so that more
Table 2
RELATIVE SALARIES OF U.S. TEACHERS
By Gender, 1940-90
Percentage of Male Nonteachers 
Earning Less Than Average Male 
Teacher
Percentage of Female Nonteachers 







1940 84.0 52.5 92.3 68.7
1950 73.4 36.2 86.7 55.0
1960 63.3 28.7 86.9 52.7
1970 62.2 25.7 85.8 47.1
1980 53.0 31.0 77.7 50.1
1990 64.0 36.5 75.1 45.3
Source: U.S. decennial census of population, public use microdata, 1940-90.18 FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / MARCH 1998
than half of all teachers had master’s degrees in 1991.
Moreover, teacher experience, while following some demo-
graphic cycles, has reached a very high level. Table 3 also
shows the decline in pupil-teacher ratios and the increase
in real spending per pupil. Because teacher salaries are
closely linked to experience and education, and because
variations in salaries and pupil-teacher ratios are the most
important determinants in spending per pupil, the added
real resources directly drive spending. Between 1960 and
1991, real spending per pupil almost tripled.
It takes little effort to see the contrast between the
growing resources in Table 3 and the flat student perfor-
mance in Charts 2 and 3. At the very least, this contrast
suggests the possibility that something is very wrong.
OTHER OBSERVATIONS ABOUT
SCHOOL EFFICIENCY
The preceding sections make a strong case that spending and
policy toward schools in the United States have not been
very well directed. Specifically, spending has improved
dramatically, but student performance—at least over the
period in which it has been measured—has not improved.
This outcome is the very essence of inefficiency: more
resources devoted to schools have not improved output.
The aggregate data, however, could be misleading.
First, costs not directly related to the typical student—for
example, costs for special education—might figure
importantly in the rise in spending. Second, the other
influences on student performance—families and friends—
could have been less favorable over time. For example,
some analysts note that single-parent families have
increased in recent decades. Also, the percentage of students in
families below the poverty level has increased. Factors such
as these could mean that more school resources are needed
to overcome existing deficits.
These issues have been debated in considerable
detail elsewhere, and there is, in my judgment, a prima facie
case against them. Nonetheless, it is also worth mentioning
the detailed microlevel evidence about the impact of
resources. The interpretation of the microlevel evidence has
been the most controversial part of the academic debate;
these controversies are less relevant to the policy debate.
The investigation of the effects of school resources
began in earnest with the publication of the “Coleman
Report” (Coleman et al. 1966). This congressionally mandated
study by the U.S. Office of Education startled many
observers by suggesting that schools did not exert a very
powerful influence on student achievement. Subsequent
attention was directed at providing additional evidence
about the effects of resources.
Over the past thirty years, a steady stream of analyses
has built up a consistent picture of the educational process.
Studies of educational performance, generally following
statistical analyses of the determinants of student achieve-
ment, include a variety of different measures of resources
devoted to schools. Commonly employed measures include
(1) the real resources of the classroom (teacher education,
teacher experience, and teacher-pupil ratios); (2) financial
aggregates of resources (expenditure per student and teacher
salary); and (3) measures of other resources in schools (specific
teacher characteristics, administrative inputs, and facilities).
The real resource category receives the bulk of
attention for several reasons. First, this category best
summarizes variations in resources at the classroom level.
Teacher education and teacher experience are the primary
determinants of teacher salaries. When combined with
Table 3
PUBLIC SCHOOL RESOURCES IN THE UNITED STATES, 1961-91
Resource 1960-61 1965-66 1970-71 1975-76 1980-81 1985-86 1990-91
Pupil-teacher ratio 25.6 24.1 22.3 20.2 18.8 17.7 17.3
Percentage of teachers with master’s degree 23.1 23.2 27.1 37.1 49.3 50.7 52.6
Median years of teacher experience 11 8 8 8 12 15 15
Current expenditure per pupil (1992-93 dollars) 1,903 2,402 3,269 3,864 4,116 4,919 5,582
Source: U.S. Department of Education (1996a).
Note: Per pupil expenditures are based on students’ average daily attendance.FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / MARCH 1998 19
teachers per pupil, these variables describe variations in the
instructional resources across classrooms. Second, these
measures are readily available and well measured. Third,
they relate to the largest changes in schools over the past
three decades. Table 3 displays the dramatic increase in
these school inputs, with pupil-teacher ratios falling
steadily, teacher experience increasing, and the percentage
of teachers with a master’s degree actually doubling
between 1960 and 1990. Fourth, studies of growth in perfor-
mance at the individual classroom level, commonly thought to
represent the superior analytical design, frequently have these
resource measures, but not the others, available.
These studies yield a simple conclusion, one that is
supported in detail elsewhere (Hanushek 1997): there is no
strong or consistent relationship between school resources
and student performance. In other words, there is little reason
to be confident that simply adding more resources to
schools as currently constituted will yield performance
gains among students. Studies of class size and pupil-
teacher ratios, of teacher education, and of teacher experience
give little if any support to policies of expanding these
resources. This finding has obvious policy implications.
Before turning to these, it is useful to clarify precisely what
is and is not implied by the data.
Perhaps the most important fact to underscore is
that this finding does not imply that all schools and teachers
are the same. Quite the contrary. Substantial evidence sug-
gests that there are large differences among teachers and
schools. The simple fact remains that these differences are
not closely related to teacher salaries or to other measured
resources devoted to programs. The Coleman Report,
which found that measured school resources explained a
small portion of the variance in student achievement, has
been commonly interpreted as implying that “schools don’t
make a difference.” This interpretation confuses the effects
of measured differences with the full effects of schools and
has been shown to be wrong. There is a significant difference
between measured resources (of the kind on which policy
frequently focuses) and the true effects of schools.11 In fact,
it is just this difference between true effects and those of
standard resources that forms the basis for the policy
considerations below.
The preceding interpretations of the general
ineffectiveness of school resource policies has been challenged
by some researchers. Two separate challenges deserve
attention before I discuss policy implications.
LABOR MARKET OUTCOMES
Taken as a group, the production function studies give little
indication that variations of resources have anything to do
with variations in student performance. However, the
widely publicized findings of Card and Krueger (1992)
indicate that variations in school resources are related to
earnings differences among workers.12 The Card and Krueger
analysis begins with samples of adult workers from the
1970 and 1980 censuses of population and fills in information
about the schooling circumstances of individuals by using
information about their year and state of birth. Card and
Krueger find that labor market earnings are directly
related to school resource differences.
Several factors could contribute to reconciling
these conclusions: differences in levels of resources considered
by each study, differences in measurement of student
performance, differences in specification, and aggregation
bias in the statistical analysis.
The workers in Card and Krueger’s sample
attended schools between the 1920s and the 1970s, a span
of time encompassing variations in the level of resources
going far beyond what is found today. This suggests one
reconciliation of the conflicting study findings: if added
resources have diminishing effects on student achievement,
current school operations may be largely “on the flat” of
the production function, while Card and Krueger observe
ranges from the past where resources had stronger effects.
A related possibility might be that the political economy
of schools has changed over time. For example, with the
rise of teachers unions and the resulting change in bargaining
positions, resources might be used in different ways and
have different student achievement implications now than
in the past (see, for example, Borland and Howsen [1992],
Peltzman [1993], and Hoxby [1996]). In other words, it is
quite possible that the enormous changes in educational
resources did have an effect on outcomes in the first half of
this century, but that more recent studies are also correct in20 FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / MARCH 1998
finding “no effect” for the sorts of resource changes
discussed in current schools.
A series of more technical discussions has also been
introduced to “choose” between the competing views of the
effects of school resources. The debate has focused on questions
about the appropriateness of measuring student perfor-
mance with achievement tests and on questions about specific
aspects of the Card and Krueger statistical methodology.
These debates go far beyond this specific paper, but they
provide, in the opinion of one of the principals in the debate,
a strong foundation for accepting the basic conclusion that
added resources have not and are unlikely to improve
student outcomes noticeably.13
META-ANALYSIS AND THE SUMMARY OF RESULTS
In some research areas, such as the investigation of the
health effects of a certain drug therapy, there is frequently
an interest in compiling results from a variety of trials.
Specialized techniques to combine the results of separate
studies and thus assess the magnitude and significance of
some relationship have been developed. These approaches
go under the general title of “meta-analysis.” The previous
summary of results represents one simple approach to the
aggregation of results, but other researchers have
attempted to do formal statistical tests.
 A well-known application of formal statistical
tests to education production function data is found in
Greenwald, Hedges, and Laine (1996). The question
they pose is whether there is any evidence that resources
or expenditure differences ever appear to affect student
performance. Their formal tests lead to rejection of this
restricted null hypothesis. The most basic problem with
their statistical analysis is that it addresses an uninteresting
question from a policy viewpoint. Their results are
sometimes interpreted as refuting the conclusion that
educational inputs do not affect performance. But in my
view, this work both confirms the previous substantive
results and points to the same policy conclusions. As all
of the analysis shows, productive results are possible,
even if seldom achieved currently. This conclusion is
central to much of the policy discussion.14
THE SCHOOLS-ARE-DOING-FINE SCHOOL
Surprisingly, in the face of evidence such as that presented
here, some commentators have argued that U.S. schools
look pretty good. Krueger (1998) has fallen in line with
Berliner and Biddle (1995) and other writers who suggest
that concerns about the performance of our education system
are quite overblown and that in reality there is evidence
both of high performance and of marked improvement.
Because these arguments have received wide circulation—
largely, it appears, from people who wish to maintain and
expand the current structure—it is useful to understand
how these arguments are constructed.
Krueger presents evidence about performance on the
NAEP exams that he generally interprets as supporting the
effectiveness of current schools. For most of his discus-
sion, he combines scores on the reading, mathematics, and
science exams for a random sample of students aged nine, thir-
teen, and seventeen between 1969 and 1996. He places great
weight on the occurrence of a statistically significant time
trend in scores and a statistically significant correlation
between scores and spending per pupil in a majority of
the nine tests.
First, note that these tests are not independent of
each other. The cohort of students tested at age nine in any
year is tested again four years later at age thirteen and
again four years later at age seventeen. The same holds true
for the cohort of students tested at age thirteen and again
four years later at age seventeen. Thus, only two of the nine
cohorts of nine-year-old students and two of the nine
cohorts of thirteen-year-old students (those tested in 1994
and 1996) are not retested and included in the NAEP
results for later ages. For policy purposes, we are clearly
most interested in performance at age seventeen, just before
students go into the job market or into postsecondary
education. The combined analysis by Krueger provides
equal weight to test measures at any point during the
educational process, even if these measures are “super-
seded” by measures closer to the finish of the process and
closer to the time when they have real importance.
The importance of combining the tests is imme-
diately apparent from looking at Charts 2 and 3 in this
paper and by comparing overall NAEP results on the per-FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / MARCH 1998 21
formance of students around the time that they leave high
school with their performance in earlier grades. For science,
the average scale score of seventeen-year-olds falls 9 points
(0.2 standard deviation) between 1969 and 1996. For
math, seventeen-year-olds improve 3 points (0.11 standard
deviation) between 1973 and 1996. For reading (not shown
in the charts), the seventeen-year-olds improve 2 points
(0.05 standard deviation) between 1971 and 1996. (Writing
performance, which is only available since 1984, shows a
fall of 7 points, or 0.2 standard deviation, by 1996.) Only
the fall in science (and in writing since 1984) is a statistically
significant difference. By contrast, there are statistically
significant increases in five out of six tests of the earlier age
groups for science, math, and reading. In other words, our
third graders are becoming better at conversation and better
at making change, even if they ultimately cannot fill out
a job application or participate in modern quality control
functions at the workplace. It is these latter findings for
early ages that permit Krueger to discuss the “surprising”
finding that there is a statistically significant trend in
student performance.
Imagine a scoring system for the summer Olympics
where the times of runners in the 100-meter dash are
recorded at 50 meters, 75 meters, and 100 meters, and
where these intermediate and final times are simply averaged
to make judgments about who is the fastest sprinter. This is
the system Krueger suggests for evaluating the performance
of U.S. elementary and secondary schools. It is possible that
an Olympic track coach would want to use the information
about performance at intermediate distances to assess which
aspects of the race each runner should work on. Similarly,
one might want to assess whether the U.S. schools are
improving or lagging at different grade levels. It is doubtful,
however, that the highly aggregated evidence of the NAEP
scores would be good evidence for making specific resource
allocations. Krueger’s use is solely to support the case that
U.S. schools are performing quite well, at least compared
with his prior perceptions.
Second, Krueger goes on to use the same basic
methodology to assess the effectiveness of school resources.
He regresses spending per student in each test year on the
existing nine NAEP scores. The entire exercise is peculiar
in the sense that one would not normally expect the per-
formance of seventeen-year-olds to be dictated by just the
spending in the current school year. Krueger is relying on
the fact that spending has moved up so steadily over the
past forty years that the current spending in any year is a
good index of differences in the cumulative spending over
the school years for different cohorts.
It is no surprise that the results of this statistical
exercise for spending are very similar to the previous inves-
tigation of trends. Chart 4 and Table 3 show that spending
has moved quite steadily upward across the period of the
NAEP scores, indicating that either current or cumulative
spending will look very similar to a time trend. From analyzing
the cumulative average spending for each of the tested
cohorts (that is, averaging spending across the prior years
of schooling for each age and test year group), the statistical
results show the same basic pattern as the simple trends,
even if there are minor changes in which estimates are
labeled statistically significant. In this version of the trend
exercise, neither the negative relationship between the science
performance of seventeen-year-olds and spending nor the
positive relationship for math performance is statistically
significant at the 10 percent level. The positive correlation
for reading is statistically significant at the 6 percent level.
Again, there is a difference for younger cohorts in each of
the tests. For age nine and age thirteen, four out of the six
correlations are statistically significant at the 5 percent
level, and five out of six are statistically significant at the
10 percent level. The overall results suggest, nonetheless,
that good performance in earlier years has not translated
effectively into higher cumulative performance at the time
of graduation, when achievement counts most.
Third, the translation of the analysis into the rela-
tionship between scores and spending allows Krueger to
perform a policy analysis that provides some feel for the
magnitude of the results. Statistical significance helps
to decide whether or not we should believe there is any
relationship at all, but it does not indicate how much we
might expect from an increase in spending. In order to be
concrete, Krueger considers a simple increase in spend-
ing of $2,000 per student. We should first be clear
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1995 (45 million in public schools), this specification
amounts to an increase in annual spending of $100 billion.
In other words, he is proposing increasing total 1995
spending on elementary and secondary students by more
than one-third. If financed entirely through appropriations by
the U.S. Department of Education, this illustrative calculation
would call for a quintupling of federal aid to schools.
On the basis of the education system’s past perfor-
mance (captured by the simple regressions of NAEP scores
for seventeen-year-olds on cumulative prior spending), student
achievement would be predicted to rise 0.06 standard
deviation in reading and 0.10 standard deviation in math;
it would be predicted to fall by 0.08 standard deviation
in science. It would seem hard to get much political or
public support for this pattern of results, even at substan-
tially lower cost. These projections are obviously not based
on the scaling of the charts assessing student performance.
Nor does translating these projections into movements
across a normal distribution of the population increase the
sense that this is what we would call a successful $100 billion
annual expenditure.
Betts (1998), using a different approach, calculates
the rate of return to additional school district spending.
His findings confirm my conclusion: on the basis of past
performance and the current structure of schools, addi-
tional spending on schools appears to have a net negative
rate of return.
In sum, a variety of researchers and commentators
have put a spin on the performance data for U.S. schools that
suggests that our schools have been doing well and have been
improving as a result of past spending increases. These
assertions are not supported by the data. Allowing these
arguments to distract us from developing more effective policy
options would be a mistake. Contrary to the assertions of
Berliner and Biddle (1995), the problems of America’s
schools represent neither myth nor fraud but instead a series of
more fundamental organizational problems.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The interpretation of the overall results about school resources
depends fundamentally on how the policy and decision-
making process is conceived. At one level, these conclusions
clearly imply that educational policymaking is more difficult
than many would like. If resources had a consistent and
predictable effect on student performance, policymaking
would be straightforward. State legislatures could decide how
much money to invest in schools and could trust local districts
to apply funds in a productive manner. But the fact that local
districts do not use funds effectively complicates this picture.
The clearest message of existing research is that uniform
resource policies will not work as intended.
Similar policy dilemmas face the courts in school
finance cases. The courts have entered into education decision
making by ruling on suits brought by people who believe that
state legislatures are not fulfilling their constitutional
obligation to provide equitable or adequate education to
particular students in each state. While frequently motivated
by concerns about student achievement, in reality both the
judicial statement of the issue and the proposed remedies center
fundamentally on the level and distribution of resources. If
resource availability is not a good index of educational out-
comes or if providing for overall resource levels does not
ensure a desired level of performance, the courts face the same
dilemma as legislatures. Simply providing more funding or a
different distribution of funding is unlikely to improve
student achievement (even though it may affect the burdens
of school financing on the citizens of a state).
A variation of this general theme is to argue that,
while resources alone may not be sufficient to guarantee
achievement, adequate resources are surely necessary.
Undoubtedly, this statement is accurate at some level, because
a school with no funds would not be expected to add anything
to student achievement. Nonetheless, as shown in Table 3, real
spending per student increased by more than 70 percent
between 1970 and 1991, even though student performance
appears to have been essentially unchanged. Further, nothing
in the previous analytical results about the effects of resources
suggests that there is a level below which resources have clear
and powerful effects on achievement that would be a demon-
stration that some schools are below the threshold of “neces-
sity.” Just asserting that there is some level of necessary
expenditure does not make the case for pure resource policies
in today’s schooling environment. While it is not possible to
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larger spending of today has clearly taken almost every school
system in the country beyond some minimal level.
This policy conundrum is precisely what led the
Panel on the Economics of Education Reform to concentrate
not on the specific resources and policies of schools but on the
incentive structure. Its report, Making Schools Work, empha-
sizes the need to alter current incentives in schools radically
(Hanushek et al. 1994). The simple premise is that the
unresponsiveness of performance to resources largely reflects
the fact that very little rests on student performance. Because
good and bad teachers or good and bad administrators can
expect about the same career progression, pay, and other out-
comes, the choice of programs, organization, and behaviors is
less dependent on student outcomes than on other things that
directly affect the actors in schools.
Underlying this view is a more benign opinion of
school personnel. Specifically, school personnel are not just
ignoring a set of policies that would lead to obvious
improvements but instead are simply following existing
incentives. An added part of this argument is that the
kinds of policies that will work in given situations with
given personnel and students vary and that these policies
are not easily described and centrally regulated. The
assumption is that, given better incentives, school personnel
can be motivated to search out what will work in their specific
situation. Under current incentives, they appear to devote
more of their attention and energies elsewhere.
Earlier work on educational production has provided
substantial evidence that vast differences exist among teachers
and schools. It is just that these differences are not easily
explained by the resources employed or by any simple set of
programmatic or behavioral descriptions. The existence of
effective teachers and schools, however, implies that one
approach to policy is to devise ways of rewarding better
performance whenever it is found. In other words, even if the
details of what will work are unavailable before the fact (or
even after the fact), policy can be described in terms of out-
comes, and good outcomes can be rewarded.
Such a description is itself much too simple because
we have limited experience with alternative incentive schemes
(Hanushek et al. 1994). The alternative incentive structures
include a variety of conceptual approaches to providing
rewards for improved student performance; they range from
merit pay for teachers to charter schools to privatization to
vouchers. These are contentious proposals, in part because the
introduction of performance incentives might lead to a variety
of people other than current school personnel making
decisions and even providing educational services. Incentive
proposals also could work well or poorly, depending on the
details. The purpose here, however, is not to consider the pros
and cons of alternatives, but to emphasize the radically
different perspective on policy that is embedded in each. Per-
formance incentives recognize that varying approaches by
teachers and schools might be productive. Thus, they avoid
the centralized “command and control” perspective of much
current policy. At the same time, they recognize that simply
decentralizing decision making is unlikely to work effectively
unless there exist clear objectives and direct accountability.15
Given the current lack of knowledge about the
design or implications of performance incentives, an aggres-
sive program of experimentation and evaluation seems very
appropriate (Hanushek et al. 1994). Nonetheless, the lack of
direct information should not be taken as support for more of
what we are doing now. We actually have considerable experi-
ence with the current organization, and current approaches
appear to offer little hope for general improvement.
The existing work does not suggest that resources
never matter. Nor does it suggest that resources could not
matter. It only indicates that the current organization and
incentives of schools do little to ensure that any added
resources will be used effectively. Faced with this problem,
some simply declare that we should still pursue general
resource policies but that we should not pursue programs that
do not work. This approach would be fine if policymakers
could reliably identify programs that do and do not work. We
know that their judgments have not been accurate in the past.24 FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / MARCH 1998 NOTES
ENDNOTES
1. The consideration of externalities is one area in which the current
U.S. situation differs from that in many other countries. At the high
levels of attainment in the United States, the case for strong influences
on literacy, the functioning of democracy, the health of the population,
or the reduction in crime—traditional items cited as externalities—seem
weak. At lower levels of attainment, a better case might be made. See
Hanushek (1996b) and Poterba (1996).
2. While I am perhaps biased toward the work I have done with Kim
(1996), the effects of qualitative differences in student performance on
national growth rates appear huge. This evidence fits nicely with concerns
that have been raised in the United States about the achievement of
students—concerns that are developed in the next section.
3. The performance of  U.S. eighth graders was relatively better in science
than in mathematics. This finding is not completely consistent with the
U.S. performance over time in the separate mathematics and science tests
of the NAEP.
4. The federal government is not the main actor in either the elementary
and secondary or the higher education arena. Of the $260 billion in
revenues for elementary and secondary schools in 1993-94, only 7 percent
came from federal funds, while 45 percent came from state funds and
the remainder was supplied by local school districts. Similarly, of
the $179 billion in revenues for higher education, slightly more
than 12 percent came from the federal government (U.S.
Department of Education 1996). More important, resources to schools
at all levels have shown considerable growth for a long time, even though
most of these funds have come from states and localities.
5. Details of the data and analysis of costs can be found in Hanushek and
Rivkin (1997). All monetary measures are adjusted by the GNP deflator to
constant 1990 dollars. Moreover, most discussion concentrates on current
expenditure, that is, total expenditure less capital investment. Unless
otherwise noted, we also use public school expenditure, excluding that
going to private schools. The proportion of students attending private
schools has ranged from 10 to 15 percent for the entire century, with a vast
majority of private school students attending Catholic schools.
6. Spending as a percent of GNP actually peaks around 1975 at 3.9 percent.
As noted below, this percentage is affected noticeably by the demographics
of the school-age population, making it a poor statistic for comparing the
intensity of resources devoted to schooling.
7. An alternative explanation is that schools attempted to protect
employment during periods of falling enrollment. While this may have been
the initial motivation, subsequent data indicate that the reductions have been
permanent ones, resistant to any increase brought about by rising
enrollment. The efficacy of improving school quality by reducing pupil-
teacher ratios has at the same time been seriously questioned.
8. This is not to say that nonpecuniary factors are unimportant in
determining whether individuals choose to teach. Rather, we assume that
nonpecuniary benefits or costs of teaching have not changed in comparison
with those in other occupations, in which case changes in relative earnings
function as a good index of where teachers fall in the labor force. The
influence of changes in wage rates on the stock of teachers is complicated,
and it depends on the choices of school districts and the behavior of
prospective teachers. See Ballou and Podgursky (1995) for a consideration
of various outcomes from wage changes.
9. A more complete analysis of spending changes, along with definitions
of the precise data used, can be found in Hanushek and Rivkin (1997).
10. The use of annual earnings, which include money teachers receive
for teaching and other occupations, obviously goes beyond comparing
pure teaching salaries with salaries in other occupations. I believe that,
while more common, using just teaching salaries produces the wrong
comparison because teachers enjoy much longer vacations than most
other workers. Overall earnings better reflect the monetary benefits of
being a teacher as opposed to having a different primary occupation.
Broad occupations clearly differ in a variety of nonmonetary ways,
including fringe benefits and average length of workday and work year.
This analysis assumes that the relative importance of these factors for
teaching and other occupations has remained constant over time.
Rothstein and Miles (1995) suggest that between 1967 and 1991,
benefits for teachers rose faster than those for the rest of the economy,
although, as they point out, such comparisons are difficult to make with
a high degree of reliability. Private school and public school teachers
are grouped together in my analyses; nevertheless, since a roughly
constant 10 percent of students attended private school throughout the
period, it is unlikely that movement in the earnings of private school teachers
would have a significant impact on the overall relative wages of teachers.
11. The clearest evidence comes from a series of covariance, or fixed-effects,
estimates of performance differences across teachers (for example, see
Hanushek [1971, 1992], Murnane [1975], Murnane and Phillips [1981],
and Armor et al. [1976]). These analyses consistently show that the
differences between a “good” and a “bad” teacher in the poverty-stricken
schools of Gary, Indiana, was approximately one grade level per academic
year; that is, a student with a good teacher might advance 1.5 grade
equivalents in a school year, while one with a bad teacher might advance
only 0.5 grade equivalent (Hanushek 1992). Moreover, the consistency of
individual teacher effects across grades and school years indicates that the
estimated differences relate directly to teacher quality and not to the
specific mix of students and the interaction of teacher and students.ENDNOTES (Continued)
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12. The Card and Krueger (1992) study is the most discussed analysis
of school resources and earnings, but it follows a larger line of research.
For an insightful review of past studies that considers underlying
characteristics of the studies, see Betts (1996).
13. Betts (1996) and Hanushek (1997) provide evidence on the
generalizability of any conclusions about the effects of resources on
measures other than achievement tests. Heckman, Layne-Farrar, and
Todd (1996) suggest that the estimates of Card and Krueger are not
robust to the database or to the model specification. They also introduce
concerns about the validity of assumptions needed to identify the key
parameters of the Card and Krueger model. Hanushek, Rivkin, and
Taylor (1996) provide evidence that the aggregated analysis relying on
state differences could bias the results toward the finding of resource
effects. See, however, the discussion in Card and Krueger (1996).
14. Other factors have entered into the discussion of meta-analysis, but
they are not central to the policy discussion here. See Hanushek (1996a,
1996c, 1997). 
15. While the decentralization considered here refers to pure resource
policies and general funding, the evidence supports this conclusion even
at the level of school-based management. See Summers and Johnson
(1996).26 FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / MARCH 1998 NOTES
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